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Abstract
The enforcement deﬁcit in EU environmental law would stem from bad Member State
governance of the autonomy they traditionally enjoy regarding the enforcement of EU
law. Both the EU legislator and the European Court of Justice take steps to ‘ﬁll in the
gaps’ and develop sanctioning requirements to improve Member State enforcement of
EU (environmental) law. These requirements are discussed in this article. The Eco Crime
Directive //EC and the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC, the latter as
recently amended, deserve some particular attention. Also the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty
are considered.
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Introduction
. It is well-known that the environmental law applicable in the Member
States of the European Union is, for the most part, of EU origin. The inﬂu-
ence of EU law on the substantial environmental policies of theMember States
can therefore hardly be overestimated. On the enforcement level however, the
sanctioning of oﬀences against EU (environmental) law has always been pri-
marily a task of the Member States. Environmental directives and regulations
often make no mention of how they should be sanctioned or simply refer to
the national law of the Member States. The EU is therefore largely depen-
dent on the Member States for the enforcement of its environmental direc-
tives and regulations. Unfortunately, Member States generally don’t seem to be
doing a very good job, resulting in an enforcement deﬁcit in EU environmental
law.
One approach of the EU to ‘ﬁll in the gaps’ and push forwardMember State
enforcement of EU environmental law in the desired direction can be described
as enforcement norm-setting:1 the development of instrumental requirements for
enforcement measures at Member State level. Apart from soft law measures—
such as guidelines, consultations and workshops—to enhance the quality of
Member State enforcement, two types of hard law measures can be distin-
guished.2 Firstly, the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ ’) in its jurisdiction grad-
ually derived some instrumental enforcement requirements from the principle
of loyal cooperation laid down in Article () TEU (Chapter ). More speciﬁ-
cally, the sanctions that Member States prescribe for violations of EU law must
be non-discriminatory (compared to the sanctioning of pure national law vio-
lations of a similar nature and importance), eﬀective, proportionate and dis-
suasive. Moreover, Member States must proceed with respect to EU law vio-
lations with the same diligence as they bring to bear in implementing corre-
sponding national laws.These requirements are binding onMember States and
constitute the boundaries of their enforcement autonomy. Secondly, the EU
legislator sometimes already incorporates speciﬁc sanctions in environmental
1) The term ‘norm-setting’ is taken from Blomberg. See A.B. Blomberg, European Inﬂuence
on National Environmental Law Enforcement: Towards an Integrated Approach, Review
of European Administrative Law  (), pp. , .
2) The same types of measures to direct Member State enforcement of EU law are distin-
guished by P.C. Adriaanse et al., Implementatie van EU-handhavingsvoorschriften: tussen
Europese regie en nationale praktijken, RegelMaat  (), pp. , –.
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directives and regulations that Member States subsequently have to implement
in their domestic legal order (Chapter ). Usually these speciﬁc sanctions are
sectorally addressed without any reference to their (criminal or administrative)
nature. Directive //EC on the protection of the environment through
criminal law3 (‘Eco Crime Directive  / /EC ’) and the recently amended
Directive //EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of
penalties, including criminal penalties, for pollution oﬀences4 (‘Ship Source Pol-
lution Directive  / /EC ’) are, however, diﬀerent in that they oblige Mem-
ber States to use criminal sanctions for certain ‘serious’ environmental oﬀences.
Chapter  discusses the extent to which the EU enforcement requirements set
out in the two previous chapters might aﬀect the environmental sanctioning
policies of the Member States. More speciﬁcally, the issue is raised whether
sanctions for EU violations should not only be implemented in law but also
in practice in case of breach. Particular attention will also be paid to the pos-
sible interference with the policy of a Member State to determine the various
sanctioning competences of the environmental enforcement agencies in a cen-
tralized legislative act. I will also take a look at the changes which the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty brings with it (Chapter ). Finally some conclusions
are drawn (Chapter ).
. The present article only concerns public enforcement of EU environmental
legislation, i.e. enforcement by competent (penal or administrative) public
authorities within Member States (as opposed to private enforcement by civil
liability lawsuits).5 The scope of this article is furthermore limited to the aspect
of the sanctioning of violations, i.e. dealing with the situation when a violation
already has been committed and the Member State concerned is aware of
the violation that has been committed. The preceding aspect of monitoring
compliance with EU environmental legislation through inspections, which
3) Council Directive //EC on the protection of the environment through criminal
law, OJ  L .
4) Directive //EC on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties,
including criminal penalties, for pollution oﬀences, OJ  L , as amended by Direc-
tive //EC amending Directive //EC on ship-source pollution and on the
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ  L .
5) For a comprehensive overview of the conceptual diﬀerences between administrative,
penal law and civil law enforcement of environmental violations, see for instance M.A.
Heldeweg, R.J.G.H. Seerden & K.R. Deketelaere, Public environmental law in Europe; a
comparative search for a ius commune, EELR  (), pp. , –.
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is also a task of the Member States under Article () TEU and can also be
addressed by the EU legislator in speciﬁc environmental provisions, will not
be discussed.6
. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on  December  the
European Union and the European Community have been merged into one
single legal entity, the European Union. The Treaty on the European Commu-
nity (‘EC ’) has been amended and is now called the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (‘TFEU ’).The Treaty on European Union (‘TEU ’) has
been amended as well, but did not change name. It therefore makes no sense
anymore to talk about the European Community/EC.Therefore in this article
the terms ‘EuropeanUnion’/‘EU’ are used while in fact they usually correspond
to the former EuropeanCommunity/EC.However, in a few paragraphs the old
terms ‘European Community’/‘EC’ still occur when explicit reference is made
to the pre-Lisbon situation with an EC pillar and a third EU pillar (e.g. the
elaboration on the infamous battle of the pillars between the Commission and
the Council over environmental criminal law in paragraph ).
A word also needs to be said about the use of the terms ‘sanctions’ and
‘penalties’ in this article. A sanction is understood as any aggravating measure
formally imposed on a violator by a public authority (a judge or a public admin-
istration) in reaction to the violation of a legal norm the violator concerned has
committed.7 Sanctions can be imposed by a criminal judge (criminal sanction),
a public administration (administrative sanction) or a civil judge in case of a
civil liability lawsuit (civil sanction). Sanctions aimed at imposing a loss on
the person concerned that goes further than remediation or when remedia-
tion is not possible, are considered punitive sanctions or penalties. Remedial
sanctions aim to remediate the violation of a legal norm or the consequences
thereof. Both criminal sanctions and administrative sanctions can have a puni-
tive or remedial character (or both at the same time). Where the EU legislator
or the ECJ is cited, the original wordings are displayed.
6) Concerning EU environmental inspection requirements, see Blomberg, supra note  at
pp. – and A.B. Blomberg, Implementatie van Europese handhavingsverplichtingen in
het Nederlandse milieurechtelijke handhavingssysteem, Milieu en Recht  (), pp. ,
–.
7) Due to this deﬁnition Directive //EC on environmental liability with regard to
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage (OJ  L ) is not discussed
in this article.
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. The General Sanctioning Requirements of the Member States
. Member States initially enjoyed very wide discretion in the sanctioning of
EU law oﬀences. The ECJ simply inferred from the principle of loyal coop-
eration currently laid down in Article () TEU the competence of Member
States ‘to choose the measures which they consider appropriate, including sanc-
tions which may even be criminal in nature’.8 The ECJ did not postulate any
explicit restriction to the Member States’ sanctioning competence. As of the
von Colson & Kamann9 and Harz10 Cases, however, the ECJ started elaborat-
ing instrumental criteria delimiting Member States’ discretion, culminating
in the milestone Greek Maize11 Case. The ECJ now clearly states that where
EU legislation ‘does not speciﬁcally provide any penalty for an infringement or
refers for that purpose to national laws, regulations and administrative provisions,
[Article () TEU]12 requires the Member States to take all measures necessary
to guarantee the application and eﬀectiveness of [EU] law’.13 And for that pur-
pose, while the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must
ensure in particular that infringements of EU law ‘are penalized under condi-
tions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in
any event, make the penalty eﬀective, proportionate and dissuasive’.14The ECJ has
since then repeated the Greek Maize case law several times in other cases, both
concerning directives and regulations, which is therefore nowwell rooted in the
EU acquis.15 One could speak of general sanctioning requirements incumbent
8) See Case /, Amsterdam Bulb BV v Produktschap voor Siergewassen [] ECR
, para. .
9) Case /, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen
[] ECR .
10) Case /, Dorit Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH [] ECR .
11) Case /, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic []
ECR .
12) With regard to EU environmental legislation, Article () TFEU oﬀers a supple-
mentary legal ground for the general sanctioning requirements of the Member States. Arti-
cle () TFEU states that ‘[w]ithout prejudice to certain measures adopted by the Union, the
Member States shall ﬁnance and implement the environment policy’.
13) Greek Maize Case, para. .
14) Greek Maize Case, para. .
15) See int.al. Case C-/, Anklagemyndigheden v Hansen & Soen I/S [] ECR I-
 and (applied to environmental law) Joined Cases C-/, C-/, C-/, C-
/, C-/, C-/, C-/, C-/, C-/ and C-/,
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on the Member States.16 Since all powers (legislative, executive and judicial)
within Member States are held by Article () TEU, both the environmental
legislator in his legislative task and the environmental enforcers with sanction-
ing competences in their enforcement task have to comply with the general
sanctioning requirements.
. It is clear that Member States’ autonomy regarding the sanctioning of EU
law violations is no longer close to absolute, but instrumentally restricted.
In principle the choice of sanctions for EU law violations still rests with the
Member States, yet this competence is delimited by the requirements of non-
discrimination (compared to the sanctioning of pure national law violations of
a similar nature and importance), eﬀectiveness, proportionality and deterrence.
The principle of equivalence or non-discrimination, a fundamental principle of
EU law and under the general enforcement requirements also referred to as the
assimilation principle,17 is based on the assumption that Member States take
care of their own legal order and its eﬀectiveness in practice.18 What Mem-
ber States consider good enough for themselves, should be good enough for
the EU as well, or should at least constitute the minimum standard regarding
EU law provisions. The principle works both upwards and downwards: EU
legislation should be enforced neither more softly nor more strictly than pure
Criminal proceedings against Sandro Gallotti, Roberto Censi, Giuseppe Salmaggi, Salvatore
Pasquire, Massimo Zappone, Francesco Segna and others, Cesare Cervetti, Mario Gasbarri,
Isidoro Narducci and Fulvio Smaldone [] ECR I-. See also Council Resolution
on the eﬀective uniform application of Community law and on the penalties applicable for
breaches of Community law in the internal market, OJ  C  and Council Resolu-
tion on the drafting, implementation and enforcement of Community environmental law,
OJ  C .
16) Concerning the general sanctioning requirements of the Member States in general, see
C. Harding, Member State Enforcement of European Community Measures: The Chimera
of ‘Eﬀective’ Enforcement, MJ  (), p.  and M. Böse, The Obligation of Member
States to Penalise Infringements of Community Law: FromGreekMaize to French Farmers,
Revue des Aﬀaires Européennes—Law & European Aﬀairs – (), p. . For a
review of the general sanctioning requirements of the Member States with regard to EU
environmental law in particular, see R. Meeus, De basishandhavingsplicht van de lidstaten
van de Europese Unie in het communautair milieurecht, Tijdschrift voor Milieurecht 
(), p.  and Blomberg, supra note  at pp. –.
17) See for instanceH.G. Sevenster, Criminal law and EC law, CML Rev  (), pp. ,
 and .
18) Böse, supra note  at p. .
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national provisions of a similar nature and importance. This concerns not only
the sanctions themselves, but also the modalities of the proceedings that apply
when a violation is prosecuted.19 The principle of equivalence can limit the
sanctioning autonomy of the Member States to a signiﬁcant extent. The clear
choice made by a Member State for criminal sanctions with regard to certain
national legislation would require the use of criminal sanctions for analogous
EU legislation as well. Yet the instrumental value of the principle is restricted.
It does not guarantee an adequate enforcement of EU legislation when Mem-
ber States do not enforce national legislation eﬀectively either. Furthermore,
the principle of equivalence only requires equivalent enforcement of EU legis-
lation compared to enforcement of pure national law ‘of a similar nature and
importance’. Hence, in so far as similar national legislation is lacking, the prin-
ciple of equivalence does not produce any eﬀect. Therefore it is clear that the
principle of equivalence in itself cannot guarantee an adequate enforcement of
EU legislation.
The sanctions thatMember States introduce to implement EU legislationmust
also be proportionate. This is not surprising since the principle of propor-
tionality is one of the fundamental principles of EU law.20 With regard to
penalties, Article () EU Charter of Fundamental Freedoms clariﬁes that
‘[t]he severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the criminal oﬀence.’ It
oﬀers important legal protection for persons: it prevents Member States from
applying sanctions that go further than is necessary to achieve the EU goals
at stake and therefore marks out the boundaries of the principles of eﬀective-
ness and deterrence. Nevertheless, the principle of proportionality also works
both upwards and downwards: both too severe and too soft sanctions would
be disproportionate. The principle of proportionality requires that a measure
(e.g. a sanction) must be appropriate and necessary to achieve its objectives.21
19) Concerning the procedural aspect, the ECJ has subsequently stated that it is for the
domestic legal system of each Member State to determine the procedural conditions gov-
erning EU law actions, but that such conditions cannot be less favourable than those relat-
ing to similar actions of a domestic nature. See Case /, Rewe-Zentralﬁnanz eG and
Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [] ECR , para. 
and Case /, Firma Wilhelm Fromme v Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Mark-
tordnung [] ECR , para. .
20) See Article () TEUwhich states that ‘[u]nder the principle of proportionality, the content
and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties’.
21) T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, , p. .
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A measure is appropriate when it is suitable, i.e. reasonably likely, to achieve
its objectives (the test of suitability). A measure is necessary when there are
no other less restrictive means capable of producing the same result (the least
restrictive alternative test). It has been said that the principle of proportional-
ity also entails a third test: it should be established that the measure does not
have an excessive impact on the applicant’s interests, even if there are no less
restrictive means available (proportionality stricto sensu).22 The ECJ does not
refrain from actually examining whether the sanctions introduced by a Mem-
ber State for EU law violations are proportionate or not.23 Taking into account
the restricting nature of penalties one could say that the principle of propor-
tionality acquires particular importance to punitive sanctions, but the principle
also applies to remedial sanctions.24 Yet the application of the principle of pro-
portionality does not always lead to one obvious outcome.There can be diverse
policy objectives involved making the proportionality test(s) more complex.25
Neither is there a national equivalent with which to compare the sanction(s),
as is the case under the principle of equivalence. The least restrictive alterna-
tive test and the assessment of proportionality stricto sensu in particular leave
Member States an inevitable margin of discretion.
The requirement that the sanctions prescribed by Member States must be dis-
suasive is another guarantee for an adequate Member State enforcement of EU
legislation. The requirement of deterrence forces Member States to introduce
suﬃciently severe sanctions for EU law violations. The ECJ in its jurisdiction
already consideredMember State sanctions for EU law violations not to be suf-
ﬁciently dissuasive.26 The requirement of deterrence presumably requires that
sanctions must have both individual and general dissuasive eﬀects.27 Individual
22) Id. at p. .
23) See for instance Case C-/, Eckehard Pastoors and Trans-Cap GmbH v Belgian
State [] ECR I- and Case C-/, Paraskevas Louloudakis v Elliniko Dimosio
[] ECR I-.
24) Tridimas, supra note  at p. .
25) Harding, supra note  at p. .
26) See for instance Case C-/, Commission of the European Communities v United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [] ECR I-; Case C-/,
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain andNorth-
ern Ireland [] ECR I- and Case C-/, Commission of the European Com-
munities v Ireland [] ECR I-. In Case C-/, however, the principle of equiv-
alence was not complied with either.
27) See also N. Hækkerup, Controls and Sanctions in the EU law, , p. .
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dissuasive eﬀect concerns deterrence towards a particular oﬀender: he should
be prevented from committing other violations in the future. General dissua-
sive eﬀect, on the other hand, refers to prevention in a broad sense, towards
everybody, including persons who have not yet committed an oﬀence. The
desired severity of the sanctions largely depends on the importance of the vio-
lated EU law provision(s) and the severity/scale of the violation. Even though
punitive sanctions are more likely to have a dissuasive eﬀect, remedial sanc-
tions should not automatically be ruled out. And even though the principle of
deterrence could make the use of criminal sanctions close to inevitable in cer-
tain cases (e.g. organized environmental crime such as waste traﬃcking), much
will depend on the level of the sanctions. Criminal ﬁnes of some hundreds or
even thousands of euros are not likely to deter well-organized criminal organi-
zations. This raises the diﬃculty of the measurement of deterrence in general.
Apart frommethodological problems, it is not always sure whether a lower rate
of oﬀending can be entirely attributed to the impact of certain sanctions.28
Lastly, the sanctions Member States introduce must be eﬀective. The precise
meaning of this requirement is not entirely clear. It appears to be very closely
linked to the requirement of deterrence. Some authors therefore discuss both
requirements together.29 In his opinion on the Hansen & Soen30 Case, Advo-
cate General Van Gerven states that the requirement of an eﬀective sanction
means ‘amongst other things, that the Member States must endeavor to attain and
implement the objectives of the relevant provisions of [EU] law’.31 In other words,
the sanction should produce a real eﬀect and should not remain a dead let-
ter.32 The requirement of eﬀectiveness seems therefore closely related to the
obligation of results to which Member States are held under Article , para
 TFEU. As a result, eﬀective enforcement of EU environmental law seems to
require remediation enforcement at the very least.33
28) Harding, supra note  at p. .
29) See J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of Public Law, , pp. –. Some authors
consider both the requirements of eﬀectiveness and deterrence as being part of a general
‘principle of eﬀectiveness’. See Böse, supra note  at pp. –.
30) Case C-/, Anklagemyndigheden v Hansen & Soen I/S [] ECR I-.
31) Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in Case C-/, Anklagemyndigheden v
Hansen & Soen I/S [] ECR I-, para. .
32) M. Poelemans, La sanction dans l’ordre juridique communautaire. Contribution à l’étude
du système répressif de l’Union européenne, , p. .
33) See Meeus, supra note  at pp. – and Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
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In conclusion, one could say that the requirement of proportionality especially
(but not solely) expresses the concern of legal protection (‘not too hard, but
not too soft either’), while the requirements of eﬀectiveness and deterrence
guarantee the suﬃciently pressing character of the Member States’ sanctions
(‘hard enough’), and that the non-discrimination requirement is somewhere
in between, although leaning more towards the requirements of eﬀectiveness
and deterrence (‘not softer but neither harder than similar national law viola-
tions’). One should not forget either that these requirements are inextricably
linked.34 The requirement of deterrence, for instance, automatically raises the
issue of proportionality. Even though in some cases the application of these
requirements may to a large extent restrict Member States’ freedom of choice,
these requirements still express concepts that need to be interpreted in concreto,
leaving Member States an inevitable margin of discretion.The requirements of
non-discrimination and proportionality, both being fundamental principles of
law in the EU legal order, must of course be interpreted in the light of the
case law of the ECJ regarding these principles. The requirements of deterrence
and certainly eﬀectiveness are somewhat vaguer. Blomberg points out that this
vagueness aﬀects the practicality of the general sanctioning requirements: they
would mainly play a role in judging—retrospectively—that a persisting vio-
lation apparently lacked deterrent and eﬀective enforcement measures, but
would fail in guiding Member States in advance in establishing deterrent and
eﬀective enforcement mechanisms.35
. Finally, one should not forget that the sanctions Member States provide for
EU law violations must also meet generally binding protective requirements,
i.e. the fundamental rights, the fundamental principles of EU law and the
fundamental EU freedoms.36 In addition to this, reference here must also be
made to the case law of the ECJ with regard to the (unlawful) inverse vertical
direct eﬀect of directives.37 A Member State cannot rely on a directive, which
has not been properly transposed in national law, against an individual.38 In
the context of criminal proceedings, the ECJ has repeatedly stated ‘that a
34) Harding, supra note  at p. .
35) Bomberg, supra note  at pp. ,  and .
36) See also Jans et al., supra note  at pp. –. Under the Lisbon Treaty the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union has the same legal value as the TEU and the
TFEU (Article (), §  TEU).
37) Id. at pp. –.
38) Case /, Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti [] ECR , para. ;
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directive cannot, of itself and independently of a national law adopted by aMember
State for its implementation, have the eﬀect of determining or aggravating the
liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of the provisions
of that directive’.39 The ECJ based these decisions on the principles of legal
certainty and non-retroactivity. This means that a directive that has not been
properly transposed, cannot be enforced by criminal law means. In its Rolex
Case the ECJ applied the same restriction to the enforcement of regulations by
criminal law means.The ECJ acknowledged that a regulation by its very nature
does not require any national implementing measures, but the regulation in
question empowered Member States to adopt penalties for infringements,
therebymaking it possible to transpose to the present case theCourt’s reasoning
in respect of directives.40 Although the ECJ has not yet ruled on this matter, it
can be assumed that this restriction also applies to the enforcement by means
of punitive administrative sanctions.41
. Speciﬁc Sanctioning Requirements in Environmental Directives and
Regulations
. Sometimes the EU legislator himself sets out provisions in environmental
directives and regulations which concern the sanctioning of violations thereof.
These provisions can, in a general way, oblige Member States to determine the
sanctions applicable to breaches of the directive or regulation and to take all
necessary measures for their implementation, stating that the sanctions deter-
mined must be eﬀective, proportionate and dissuasive. In essence, such pro-
visions do nothing more than resuming the general sanctioning requirements
under Article () TEU with regard to the directive or regulation in question.
They remind Member States of the general sanctioning requirements to which
they are held under Article () TEU. Sometimes, however, environmental
directives and regulations contain speciﬁc sanctioning provisions that envisage
Case  /, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [] ECR , para. ; and
Case /, M.H. Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health
Authority (Teaching) [] ECR , para. .
39) Case /, Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV [] ECR
, para.  and Case C-/, Criminal proceedings against Luciano Arcaro []
ECR I-, para. .
40) Case C-/, Criminal proceedings against X [] ECR I-, paras. –. In
practice most regulations require Member States to implement enforcement measures.
41) Jans et al., supra note  at p. .
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a speciﬁc violation and determine how to deal with this violation.42 In these
cases it is still up to the Member States to apply the prescribed sanctions in
their domestic legal order, but the EU legislator has already to a greater or
lesser extent determined the type and scope of the applicable sanctions. These
sanctioning requirements incumbent on the Member States I call speciﬁc sanc-
tioning requirements.43 They do not necessarily exclude the application of the
general sanctioning requirements; this would only be the case when the EU
legislator exhaustively lists the sanctions Member States may impose.44 Obvi-
ously when Member States apply the speciﬁc sanctions prescribed in direc-
tives and regulations, the same protective requirements have to be complied
with as under the general sanctioning requirements.45 An example of a speciﬁc
sanctioning requirement is the obligation of the competent authorities of the
Member States under the Groundwater Directive  //EEC46 to withdraw
an authorization, if necessary, should the conditions laid down in the autho-
rization not be complied with.47
. Initially, however, it was unclear whether the (former) EC legislator was
actually competent to provide for (punitive) sanctions in EC directives and
regulations. After all, the enforcement of EU law traditionally is a prerogative
of the Member States and the EC Treaty did not oﬀer an express legal ground
for (punitive) sanctions in EC directives and regulations. Therefore Case C-
/48 was a milestone case since the ECJ acknowledged for the ﬁrst time
the competence of the EC legislator to determine (punitive) administrative
sanctions in secondary EC law.49
42) C.M. Billiet, Bestuurlijke sanctionering van milieurecht. Wetgeving en praktijk, ,
p. .
43) See R.Meeus, Speciﬁeke sanctieverplichtingen in het Europeesmilieurecht: een zorg voor
onze wetgever en handhavers?, Milieu en Recht  (), p. ; Blomberg, supra note  at
pp. – and Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
44) Case C-/, Criminal proceedings against Maria Amélia Nunes and Evangelina de
Matos [] ECR I-, para. .
45) See para. .
46) Council Directive  //EEC on the protection of groundwater against pollution
caused by certain dangerous substances, OJ  L .
47) Article () Directive.
48) Case C-/, Federal Republic of Germany v Commission of the European Com-
munities [] ECR I-.
49) Despite the fact that the ECJ refrained from explicitly acknowledging the punitive
character of the administrative sanctions in question, they clearly go further than the mere
remediation of the damage.
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Still the question remained unanswered whether the EC legislator could also
provide for criminal sanctions in EC directives and regulations. Presumed nec-
essary by the EC legislator for a dissuasive environmental law enforcement, this
was subject to controversy since most of the Member States were (and still are)
reluctant to transfer to the EU their most powerful tool to regulate individual
liberties (ius puniendi). Member States considered the third EU pillar (former
Title VI TEU, Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters)50 as the
proper legal path for EU measures in criminal matters. This had to do with
the diﬀerences between the ﬁrst EU pillar (the EC pillar) and the third EU
pillar: EC interference in the national criminal law of the Member States was
more intrusive than interference from the third EU pillar.51 Moreover, the EU
was not free to choose between the ﬁrst and the third EU pillars: an instrument
could only be adopted under Title VI TEUwhere there was no EC competence
for doing so.52 Eventually, after an unparalleled institutional quarrel between
the European Commission and the Council about the proper legal instrument
(an EC directive based on old Article  EC on environmental protection53
versus a framework decision based on old Title VI TEU on organized crime)54
for a legislative act concerning criminal environmental law, the ECJ settled the
matter in its Environmental Crime55 Case, another landmark judgment. The
50) Currently judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation are deter-
mined in Chapters  (Articles –) and  (Articles –) of Title V TFEU.
51) The main diﬀerences concerned the almost exclusive right of initiative of the European
Commission under the EC pillar (versus a shared right of initiative between the European
Commission and the Member States under the third EU pillar), a stronger European Par-
liament under the EC pillar (co-decision procedure), stronger enforcement powers of the
European Commission and the ECJ under the EC pillar, qualiﬁed majority voting (as a gen-
eral but not absolute rule) under the EC pillar (versus unanimity under the third EU pillar),
and the direct eﬀect of EC directives (versus framework decisions which could not have
direct eﬀect). Yet the ECJ decided in its milestone Pupino Case that framework decisions
under the third EU pillar had indirect eﬀect, requiring national courts to interpret national
law in accordance with framework decisions (Case C-/, Criminal proceedings against
Maria Pupino [] ECR I-). See also M. Wasmeier and N. Thwaites, The ‘battle of
the pillars’: does the European Community have the power to approximate national crim-
inal laws?, EL Rev  (), pp. ,  and R. Pereira, Environmental Criminal Law
in the First Pillar: A Positive Development for Environmental Protection in the European
Union?, EELR  (), pp. , .
52) Old Articles  and  TEU expressed the clear primacy of EC law and competence
over Title VI TEU.
53) Currently Article  TFEU.
54) Currently Title V TFEU.
55) Case C-/, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European
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ECJ decided that although as a general rule neither criminal law nor the rules of
criminal procedure fell within EC competence, this ‘does not prevent the Com-
munity legislature, when the application of eﬀective, proportionate and dissuasive
criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is an essential measure for
combating serious environmental oﬀences, from taking measures which relate to the
criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary in order to ensure
that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are fully eﬀective’.56
There could be no more doubt (at least not in the domain of environmen-
tal law) that the EC legislator was competent to take measures concerning the
criminal law of theMember States when it considered those measures necessary
in order to make its substantive (environmental) provisions fully eﬀective.
Yet doubts remained concerning the ‘breadth’ (whether the EC had criminal
law competence in relation to matters other than the environment) and the
‘depth’ (whether the EC had competence to harmonize not only criminal
oﬀences, but also criminal sanctions) of the EC criminal competence.57 After
all, the decision of the ECJ in the Environmental Crime Case only related
to old Article  EC on environmental protection, and the ECJ failed to
clarify whether the EC legislator was also competent to determine the type
(e.g. monetary or custodial) and the level (e.g. , or ,) of the
criminal sanctions at EC level. The European Commission, conﬁdent after the
Environmental Crime ruling, soon had to adjust its ambitious aspirations. In
the Ship Source Pollution58 Case the ECJ had to settle another quarrel between
the European Commission and the Council over the proper legal ground for
criminal lawmeasures with regard to environmental protection in sea transport
(old Article () EC on sea and air transport59 versus old Title VI TEU on
organized crime).60 The ECJ conﬁrmed the Environmental Crime ruling with
regard to measures concerning environmental protection in sea transport (old
Article () EC), but clariﬁed that the determination of the type and level
Union [] ECR I-.
56) Environmental Crime Case, para. .
57) The terms ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ are taken from Advocate General Mazák in his Opinion
in the Ship Source Pollution Case (Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in Case C-/,
Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union []
ECR I-, paras. ,  and ).
58) Case C-/, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European
Union [] ECR I-.
59) Currently Article  TFEU.
60) Currently Title V TFEU.
Roel Meeus / JEEPL . () – 
of the criminal sanctions to be applied did not fall within the EC sphere of
competence.61 In conclusion, the EC legislator was competent to determine
criminal oﬀences if necessary for eﬀective environmental protection, not to
determine the type and level of the criminal sanctions.
. A systematic analysis of the applicable EU environmental legislation (hori-
zontal acts, water protection, air pollution, climate change, ozone layer protec-
tion, waste, dangerous substances, noise pollution and green energy acts)62 has
made it clear that diﬀerent types of speciﬁc sanctioning requirements occur in
EU environmental law. I distinguish ﬁve diﬀerent types:63
. Speciﬁc sanctioning requirements aimed at the remediation of the situation
(e.g. an obligation to take back waste when transported illegally);
. Speciﬁc sanctioning requirements that hit the oﬀender in his rights (e.g. the
withdrawal of an authorization when the conditions are not met);
. Speciﬁc sanctioning requirements that leave Member States the choice be-
tween the two previous ones (e.g. a suspension of discharge when the
authorization conditions are not met);
. A monetary speciﬁc sanctioning requirement under the Emissions Trading
Directive //EC;64 and
. A naming and shaming speciﬁc sanctioning requirement under the Emis-
sions Trading Directive //EC.65
All of the revealed speciﬁc sanctioning requirements are established in sectoral
EU environmental acts and therefore have a sectorally limited scope. Most
of them belong to the ﬁrst type of speciﬁc sanctioning requirements—those
aimed at the remediation of the situation—and therefore have a remedial char-
acter.66 None of them have an explicitly determined (criminal or administra-
61) Ship Source Pollution Case, para. .
62) Nature protection laws like Directive //EC on the conservation of wild birds
(OJ  L ), Council Directive  //EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and
of wild fauna and ﬂora (OJ  L ) and Council Regulation (EC) No / on the
protection of species of wild fauna and ﬂora by regulating trade therein (OJ  L ), are
not implied.
63) See Meeus, supra note  at pp. –.
64) Council Directive //EC establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive  //EC,
OJ L . See Article ()-() Directive.
65) Article () Directive.
66) See Meeus, supra note  at pp. – and Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
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tive) nature, thereby in principle leaving open both implementation paths to
theMember States.67Themargin of discretion that is left to the Member States
depends on the wording used by the EU legislator, ranging from a wide mar-
gin of discretion (e.g. ‘can’ competences to sanction) to an almost complete
absence of discretion (e.g. a precisely ﬁxed ﬁne).68 Sector-speciﬁc sanctioning
requirements occur rather occasionally in EU environmental law and seem
to be set at random. The IPPC Directive //EC69 for instance, which
includes important permit requirements, does not contain any speciﬁc sanc-
tioning requirement.The majority of environmental directives and regulations
do not contain speciﬁc sanctioning requirements and therefore on the enforce-
ment level are governed mainly by the general sanctioning requirements (leav-
ing Member States more discretion).
. After the determination of the EC criminal competence and the ‘depth’
thereof in the Environmental Crime and Ship Source Pollution Cases, the (now
third) European Commission proposal for a directive on the protection of
the environment through criminal law was ﬁnally adopted by the European
Parliament and the Council on  November . The Eco Crime Directive
//EC70 was the ﬁrst EC directive in the EC/EU history to contain
provisions with regard to criminal law. More speciﬁcally, Member States have
to ensure that nine deﬁned conducts constitute a criminal oﬀence, when
unlawful and committed intentionally or with at least serious negligence.71
Thus a criminal oﬀence in the sense of the Directive requires three constitutive
elements: () a material element (the conduct), () a moral element (intention
67) Some of the speciﬁc sanctioning requirements however have an implicit administrative
nature, since they concern sanctions that are traditionally adopted in administrative enforce-
ment law (e.g. the withdrawal of authorizations) or because the EU legislator has put the
competence to deliver an authorization and the competence to impose a sanction in the
hands of the same (administrative) body.
68) Article ()-() Emissions Trading Directive //EC.
69) Directive //EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control, OJ 
L .
70) The directive came into force on  December  (Article ). Member States shall
take the necessary implementation measures before  December  (Article ). For an
extensive review of the directive, seeH.E. Zeitler, Happy end of a long saga—Agreement on
the Directive for the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, JEEPL 
(.–), p.  and A. Gouritin and P. De Hert, Directive //EC of  November
 on the protection of the environment through criminal law: A new start for criminal
law in the European Community?, elni  (), p. .
71) Article  Directive.
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or serious negligence), and () a legal element (unlawfulness). Three conducts
relate to the protection of biodiversity,72 two conducts to waste,73 one conduct
to dangerous activities and substances,74 one conduct to nuclear materials,75
one conduct to ozone-depleting substances,76 and ﬁnally one general conduct
concerns the discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of materials
or ionizing radiation into air, soil or water.77 All conducts require a severity
threshold to be exceeded in order to constitute a criminal oﬀence,78 except the
conduct relating to ozone-depleting substances.79 The required moral element
(mens rea) is intent or at least serious negligence.80 The Directive does not
deﬁne intent and serious negligence, leaving this to the discretion of the
Member States. The ECJ, however, referred to serious negligence as ‘entailing
an unintentional act or omission by which the person responsible commits a patent
breach of the duty of care which he should have and could have complied with
in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and individual situation’.81 To be
unlawful, a conduct must infringe the legislation listed in the Annexes or
a law, an administrative regulation of a Member State or a decision taken
72) Article , (f ), (g) and (h) Directive.
73) Article , (b) and (c) Directive.
74) Article , (d) Directive.
75) Article , (e) Directive.
76) Article , (i) Directive.
77) Article , (a) Directive.
78) In four cases the conduct only constitutes a criminal oﬀence when it ‘causes or is likely
to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, the
quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants’ (Article , (a), (b), (d) and (e)
Directive). Two conducts constitute a criminal oﬀence, ‘except for cases where the conduct
concerns a negligible quantity of such specimens and has a negligible impact on the conservation
status of the species’ (Article , (f ) and (g) Directive). Article , (h) Directive criminalizes any
conduct which causes ‘signiﬁcant deterioration’ of a habitat within a protected site. Lastly, the
unlawful shipment of waste only constitutes a criminal oﬀence when it is undertaken in a
‘non-negligible quantity’ (Article , (c) Directive). The vagueness of the severity tresholds
may spell troubles for the Member States when implementing the Directive. What has
to be understood under serious injury, substantial damage, signiﬁcant deterioration and a
negligible quantity or impact? Leaving the interpretation of these tresholds to the Member
States might jeopardise the goal of the Directive, i.e. the harmonisation of the most serious
environmental crimes within the EU.
79) Article , (i) Directive.
80) Article  Directive.
81) See Case C-/, The Queen, on the application of International Association of
Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport
[] ECR I-, para. .
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by a competent authority of a Member State that gives eﬀect to the EU
legislation referred to in the Annexes.82 Also inciting, aiding and abetting
the intentional conduct referred to in Article  must be made punishable
as a criminal oﬀence.83 In accordance with the Ship Source Pollution Case
the Directive does not determine the type or level of the criminal sanctions
concerned; it is left up to the Member States to ensure that the oﬀences
referred to in Articles  and  are punishable by eﬀective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties.84 Under certain conditions legal persons85 can
also be held liable for oﬀences referred to in Articles  and .86 Legal persons
held liable under the Directive must be punishable by eﬀective, proportionate
and dissuasive penalties.87 Consequently, the Directive leaves the choice of the
nature of the sanctions for legal persons (criminal or administrative) up to
the Member States. The reason for this is that the EU did not want to oblige
Member States to introduce the criminal liability of legal persons where this is
not yet foreseen in their legal order.88
. The EU legislator also took the occasion to amend the Ship Source Pol-
lution Directive //EC.89 This was done by Directive //EC of
82) Article , (a) Directive. The consequence of the annex approach is that the EU legislator
deciding on new environmental legislation will have to decide whether it is appropriate or
not to add the new instrument to the annex. Where necessary, Article  Directive should
be amended (Directive, Preamble, recital ). Since the references to the directives and
regulations in the Annexes are dynamic, also future changes in the listed legislation are
covered. See also Zeitler, supra note  at p. .
83) Article  Directive.
84) Article  Directive.
85) A legal person is deﬁned as ‘any legal entity having such status under the applicable
national law, except for states or public bodies exercising state authority and public international
organizations’ (Article (d) Directive).
86) Article () Directive. The article also concerns the liability of legal persons when an
oﬀence in the sense of Article  or  is due to a lack of supervision or control by the natural
person having a leading position within the legal person (Article () Directive) and the
aggregation of liabilities between legal and natural persons (Article () Directive).
87) Article  Directive.
88) See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on the protection of the environment through criminal law, COM ()  ﬁnal, 
February .This proposal was the second European Commission proposal for a directive
on this matter. See also Gouritin and De Hert, supra note  at p. .
89) The original Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC entered into force on Octo-
ber  (Article  Directive). Member States had to take the necessary implementa-
tion measures by  March  (Article  Directive). In a decision of  July  the
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 October  amending Directive //EC on ship-source pollution
and on the introduction of penalties for infringements.90 The words ‘including
criminal penalties’ were added to the title and the purpose of the Directive,
indicating what the amendment was all about: imposing the use of criminal
sanctions for ship-source pollution oﬀences. The criminalized conduct (mate-
rial element) concerns ship-source discharges of polluting substances into any
of the areas referred to in Article () Directive.91 Minor cases, where the
act committed does not cause deterioration in the quality of water, do not
constitute criminal oﬀences in the sense of the Directive (severity treshold).92
Repeated minor cases, however, that do not individually but in conjunction
result in deterioration in the quality of water, constitute a criminal oﬀence,
if committed with intent, recklessly or with serious negligence.93 The applica-
ble moral element (mens rea) for discharging polluting substances in the areas
concerned, is intent, recklessly or serious negligence.94 The discharging of pol-
luting substances does not have to be unlawful (legal element), as is the case
for criminal oﬀences under the Eco CrimeDirective //EC. Article ()
ECJ condamned the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for fail-
ing to introduce penalties for ship-source pollution in the sense of the Ship Source Pol-
lution Directive //EC. See Case C-/, Commission of the European Com-
munities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [] <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:J:EN:HTML>.
90) OJ  L . The Amending Directive entered into force on  November 
(Article  Amending Directive). Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by November 
(Article  Amending Directive).
91) Articles () and a() Directive. Article () Directive refers to the following areas:
‘(a) the internal waters, including ports, of a Member State, in so far as the Marpol regime
is applicable;
(b) the territorial sea of a Member State;
(c) straits used for international navigation subject to the regime of transit passage, as laid
down in Part III, section , of the  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to
the extent that a Member State exercises jurisdiction over such straits;
(d) the exclusive economic zone or equivalent zone of a Member State, established in accor-
dance with international law; and
(e) the high seas’.
92) Article a() Directive.
93) Article a() Directive.
94) Articles () and a() Directive. Intent, recklessly and serious negligence are not
deﬁned. For serious negligence, see Case C-/,TheQueen, on the application of Inter-
national Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary
of State for Transport [] ECR I-, para. .
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Directive, however, states that a discharge of polluting substances into the areas
concerned, shall not be regarded as an oﬀence, ‘if it satisﬁes the conditions set
out in Annex I, Regulations , , , or , or in Annex II, Regulations ,
.. or .. of Marpol  / ’. Such a discharche shall neither be regarded as
an oﬀence for the owner, the master or the crew, ‘if it satisﬁes the conditions
set out in Annex I, Regulation , or in Annex II, Regulation .. of Marpol
 / ’.95 Also any act of inciting, or aiding and abetting an oﬀence committed
with intent and referred to in Article a() and (), is punishable as a criminal
oﬀence.96 Again in accordance with the Ship Source Pollution Case the Direc-
tive does not determine the type or level of the criminal sanctions concerned;
the Directive leaves it up to the Member States to ensure that the oﬀences
referred to in Articles a() and (b) are punishable by eﬀective, proportionate
and dissuasive criminal penalties.97 Also under the amended Ship Source Pol-
lution Directive //EC legal persons98 can, under certain conditions, be
held liable for the oﬀences referred to in Articles a(), a() and b.99 Legal
persons held liable pursuant to Article b Directive, must be made punishable
by eﬀective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties.100 Thus, neither under the
Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC, the liability of legal persons has
to be of a criminal nature.
. The Impact of the EU Enforcement Requirements on the Environmental
Sanctioning Policies of the Member States
. The discussed EU enforcement requirements raise the controversial issue
whether they require Member States not only to foresee but also to apply sanc-
95) Article () Directive.
96) Article b Directive.
97) Article a Directive.
98) A legal person in the sense of the Directive is ‘any legal entity in possession of such status
under applicable national law, other than States themselves or public bodies in the exercise of
State authority or public international organisations’ (Article () Directive). Regardless the
slightly diﬀerent wording, this deﬁnition is identical to the one of legal persons under the
Eco Crime Directive //EC.
99) Article b() Directive. The article also concerns the liability of legal persons when an
oﬀence in the sense of Articles a(), a() and b is due to a lack of supervision or control by
the natural person having a leading position within the legal person (Article b() Directive)
and the aggregation of liabilities between legal and natural persons (Article b() Directive).
100) Article c Directive.
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tions in practice. In the Spanish Strawberries101 Case, the ECJ clearly held that
a failure to prosecute a violation of EU law could constitute a breach of Arti-
cle () TEU and aMember State can be challenged before the ECJ for its fail-
ure to prosecute. Moreover, the ECJ upholds a fairly strict case law relating to
EU environmental law provisions that require Member States to obtain precise
and speciﬁc results after a certain period.102 Neither do there seem to be sig-
niﬁcant possibilities for Member States to be exempted from their obligations
under Article () TEU.103 The ECJ case law therefore leaves Member States
little choice but to ensure that such precise substantive environmental require-
ments are not only properly transposed into their domestic legal order but also
101) Case C-/, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic []
ECR I-.
102) See for instance Case C-/ in which the French Republic was condemned because
several waste incinerators did not meet the precise combustion requirements imposed by
two waste incineration directives (Case C-/, Commission of the European Commu-
nities v French Republic [] ECR I-). Another striking example is Case C-/,
Commission of the European Communities v Ireland [] ECR I-. Here the ECJ
stated that the obligation of waste disposal and waste recovery undertakings or establish-
ments to hold a permit, an obligation formulated under the Directive  //EEC on
waste (OJ  L ) in clear and unequivocal terms to achieve a certain result, is only
complied with ‘if, in addition to the correct transposition of the provisions into domestic law,
the operators concerned have the permit required ’. The ECJ goes on to say that ‘Member States
therefore have the task of making sure that the permit system set up is actually applied and com-
plied with, in particular by conducting appropriate checks for that purpose and ensuring that
operations carried out without a permit are actually brought to an end and punished ’. Both
cases are an example of the GAP-approach of the Commission: several complaints and/or
cases of non-compliance, usually bad application cases, are bundled up and taken into one
single infringement procedure to prove that aMember State is responsible for—in the words
of the Commission—‘general and persistent infringements’ of EU law. See Blomberg, supra
note  at p. . It is also noticeable that when a permit in which emission standards are
laid down, is made compulsory, Member States cannot choose to implement a declaratory
scheme (Case C-/, Association nationale pour la protection des eaux et rivières—
TOS v Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement et de l’Aménagement durables []
ECR I-).
103) In the Blackpool Case the ECJ stated that the United Kingdom had not succeeded
in establishing the existence of an absolute physical impossibility to carry out the obliga-
tions imposed by Directive  //EEC concerning the quality of bathing water (Case C-
/, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland [] ECR I-). Hereby the ECJ seemed to suggest that the
establishment of the existence of an absolute physical impossibility could exempt a Mem-
ber State from its obligations under EU environmental law. Until now however no Mem-
ber State has succeeded in proving this. Subsequently in the Schmidberger Case the ECJ
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that they are achieved in the ﬁeld, if necessary by taking appropriate enforce-
ment measures. The ultimate goal of any enforcement action should therefore
always be the fulﬁllment of the environmental obligations of result at stake.
This entails in any case the obligation to start up an enforcement procedure
when a violation of an EU environmental law provision has been reported.
This procedure must be managed in a fairly strict way, leading to the decision
to impose a sanction when soft enforcement measures (such as warnings) do
not produce the desired eﬀects.104 Where the EU legislator does not specify
which sanction should be applied, the sanction must in any case be equivalent,
proportionate, deterrent and eﬀective. This entails a sanction that is suitable to
produce the eﬀects in practice which EU law requires. Clearly this could raise
doubts as to whether Member States with a criminal procedure governed by
the opportunity principle, under which there is no obligation to prosecute, can
fully maintain this principle. However, with regard to the Eco Crime Directive
//EC and the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC in partic-
ular, it should be mentioned that the Preambles of these directives state that
the directives do not create obligations regarding the application of the crimi-
nal sanctions, or any other available system of law enforcement, in individual
cases.105
. The presence of speciﬁc sanctioning requirements in EU environmen-
tal law might in some cases aﬀect the environmental policy of a Member
State to determine the various sanctioning competences of the environmen-
tal enforcement agencies in a centralized legislative act. Such a policy has the
advantage that all the possible sanctions which may be imposed for various
environmental oﬀences can be found in one single legislative act. The recent
Flemish Environmental Enforcement Decree106 for instance makes a distinc-
tion between environmental crimes and environmental violations, by which
accepted for the ﬁrst time that a Member State was entitled to consider that an outright
ban on a demonstration obstructing the free movement of goods, would have constituted
unacceptable interference with the fundamental rights of the demonstrators to gather and
express peacefully their opinion in public (Case C-/, Eugen Schmidberger, Inter-
nationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich [] ECR I-). It seems,
however, to have been quite an exceptional case, and the possibilities for referring to this
case law in cases concerning EU environmental law seem rather limited.
104) Billiet, supra note  at p. .
105) Eco Crime Directive //EC, Preamble, recital  and Directive //EC
amending the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC, Preamble, recital .
106) Flemish Decree of  December , M.B.  February .
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the former in the ﬁrst place can be sanctioned with criminal sanctions (unless
the public prosecutor decides not to prosecute, in which case an alternative
administrative ﬁne may be imposed), while the latter can only be sanctioned
with exclusive administrative ﬁnes.107 Both alternative and exclusive adminis-
trative ﬁnes can be imposed together with an administrative forfeiture of ille-
gally acquired beneﬁts. The Flemish Government has subsequently made the
Flemish Environmental Enforcement Decree applicable to a whole range of
substantial environmental provisions in various legislative and executive acts
(which often implement EU environmental law provisions), thus determining
the oﬀences involving environmental violations (as opposed to environmental
crimes).108 Such eﬀorts byMember States to centralize and harmonize the sanc-
tions which the competent environmental enforcement agencies may impose
for various environmental oﬀences could be aﬀected by the use of speciﬁc sanc-
tioning requirements in environmental directives and regulations. Depending
on the speciﬁcity of the character of these EU law provisions, it is very well
possible that they require speciﬁc implementation measures by Member States
in the sense that the existing sanctioning competences do not constitute a suﬃ-
cient implementation. A general competence to sanction—or ‘can’ competence
to sanction—would for instance not suﬃce to implement a speciﬁc sanction
with a compulsory character regarding its application.109 Where the EU legis-
lator provides for criminal environmental oﬀences (as in the Eco Crime Direc-
tive //EC and the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC), EU
inﬂuence is even more outspoken, since Member States are then obliged to
implement criminal sanctions.
107) For both environmental crimes and environmental violations, however, so-called
‘administrative measures’ may be imposed.These actually involve sanctions such as the order
to stop or execute certain types of conduct, the sealing of certain goods and the entire or
partial closure of an installation.
108) Executive Decree of the Flemish Government of  December , M.B.  February
.
109) See for instance Article (), (a)-(b) Directive  //EEC concerning the placing of
plant protection products on the market (OJ  L ), stating that ‘an authorization
shall be cancelled if it is established that: (a) the requirements for obtaining the authorization
are not or are no longer satisﬁed; (b) false or misleading particulars were supplied concerning the
facts on the basis of which the authorization was granted ’. A general competence to withdraw
the authorization on the grounds concerned does not seem a suﬃcient transposition. The
transposing provision must also ‘translate’ the compulsory character of the speciﬁc sanction.
See Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
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However, EU legislative inﬂuence on the environmental sanctioning policies of
the Member States does not seem to be all that vigorous. As stated before, only
occasionally environmental directives and regulations contain speciﬁc sanc-
tioning requirements. Moreover, most speciﬁc sanctioning requirements have
a rather discretionary character—as opposed to a compulsory character—and
might therefore be suﬃciently implemented by generally determined sanc-
tioning competences.110 As regards the Eco Crime Directive //EC,
the obligation to introduce criminal sanctions is limited to nine deﬁned con-
ducts. Moreover, all of these conducts only constitute a criminal oﬀence when
committed unlawfully and intentionally or with at least serious negligence.111
And for all of these conducts except one, criminal liability is made dependent
on a severity threshold being exceeded. The Ship Source Pollution Directive
//EC as well has a limited scope. It only concerns ship-source pollution
oﬀences in designated areas, when committed with intent, recklessly or with
serious negligence.112 And implementing criminal sanctions is not compulsory
for minor discharges, where it does not cause deterioration in the quality of
water.113 Yet deterrence and eﬀectiveness of any sanction, including criminal
ones, depend to a great extent on the type and level thereof. A  ﬁne for an
illegal waste transport is clearly not a deterrent and eﬀective ﬁne, whether it is
criminal or administrative. Yet this is exactly what is lacking in the Eco Crime
Directive //EC and the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC
as a consequence of the Ship Source Pollution Case. Consequently it is hard
to imagine how these directives will eﬀectively raise the level playing ﬁeld of
the Member States with regard to the sanctioning of the deﬁned conducts.114
Of course the criminal sanctions which Member States must establish under
both directives need to be eﬀective, proportionate and dissuasive, but this is a
110) See Meeus, supra note  at p.  and Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
111) The inciting, aiding and abetting of the deﬁned conducts, however, is only punish-
able as a criminal oﬀence under the Eco Crime Directive //EC, when committed
intentionally (Article  Directive).
112) The inciting, aiding and abetting of an oﬀence referred to in Article a() and () Ship
Source Pollution Directive //EC, however, is only punishable as a criminal oﬀence
under the Directive when committed intentionally (Article b Directive).
113) However, repeated minor cases that do not individually but in conjunction result in
deterioration in the quality of water shall be regarded as a criminal oﬀence, if committed
with intent, recklessly or with serious negligence (Article a() Ship Source Pollution
Directive //EC).
114) See also Pereira, supra note  at p. .
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general obligation under Article () TEU, so what is their added value? None
of the directives force Member States to impose criminal sanctions on legal
persons, whereas it is precisely legal persons who play a leading role in serious
environmental crime.115 None of the directives oblige Member States to apply
criminal sanctions in individual cases,116 nor exclude other types of liability
next to criminal liability.117 Finally, the Eco CrimeDirective //EC only
provides for minimum rules, leaving Member States free to adopt or maintain
more stringent measures.118
Concluding, the EU legislator, by creating both directives, has given Mem-
ber States a clear push towards a criminal settlement of ‘serious’ environmen-
tal crimes, which will undoubtedly have to be reﬂected in the environmental
enforcement practices of the Member States.119 But altogether it seems that
the impact of the Eco Crime Directive //EC and the Ship Source Pol-
lution Directive //EC will be limited. There seems to be enough dis-
cretion left for Member State enforcers in individual cases.120 Member States
115) The Impact Assessment accompanying the second European Commission proposal for
a directive on environmental criminal law refers to a study in  which found that in
 of all researched environmental crime cases corporations or corporate-like structures
were involved. See Commission accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment
through criminal law—Impact Assessment, SEC () ,  February . For similar
critical remarks on this matter, see M. Faure, European Environmental Criminal Law: Do
we really need it?, EELR  (), pp. ,  and Pereira, supra note  at pp. –
.
116) Eco Crime Directive //EC, Preamble, recital  and Directive //EC
amending the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC, Preamble, recital . Blomberg,
however, rightly argues that structural shortcomings in practice—she mentions the com-
plete absent or very rare use in practice of criminal sanctions for the criminalized con-
ducts concerned in combination with unsuﬃciently eﬀective administrative enforcement
measures—could lead to a breach of the Eco Crime Directive //EC. See Blomberg,
supra note  at p. .
117) Eco Crime Directive //EC, Preamble, recital  and Directive //EC
amending the Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC, Preamble, recital .The latter
also mentions international law.
118) EcoCrimeDirective //EC, Preamble, recital . Recital  expresses the general
rule under Article  TFEU: ‘The protective measures adopted pursuant to Article  shall
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent protective
measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They shall be notiﬁed to the
Commission’.
119) Blomberg, supra note  at pp. – and Blomberg, supra note  at pp. –.
120) See also Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
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will of course have to criminalize the envisaged conducts when this is not yet
the case, but this does not rule out an administrative-orientated enforcement
policy.121
. Does the Lisbon Treaty Change Anything?
. On the whole, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on  December
 does not bring that many changes to EU environmental policy.122On the
enforcement level, however, some changes are certainly worth mentioning.123
Article () TFEU now states that, ‘[i]f the approximation of criminal laws
and regulations of the Member States proves essential to ensure the eﬀective imple-
mentation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonization
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the deﬁnition of
criminal oﬀences and sanctions in the area concerned ’. Apparently the EU now
does have the competence to determine the type and level of criminal sanc-
tions in directives, in contrast with the (former) criminal competence of the
EC. Yet this is restricted by the competence of each Member State to suspend
the ordinary legislative procedure and refer the draft directive in question to
the European Council when it considers that the draft directive would aﬀect
fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system.124 The European Council
then has four months to reach a negotiated solution, after which the draft
directive is sent back to the Council to be voted upon. Should no consensus be
reached in the European Council, the possibility exists for at least nine Mem-
ber States to establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft directive
concerned. The possibility for Member States to use this emergency brake pro-
cedure amounts to a step back compared to the pre-Lisbon situation, since
no such procedure existed within the environment and transport titles of the
former EC Treaty.
121) See also Blomberg, supra note  at p. .
122) For a comprehensive review of the (little) changes the Lisbon Treaty produces for EU
environmental policy, seeW.T. Douma & H.H.B. Vedder, Het Verdrag van Lissabon en het
Europees milieubeleid, SEW  (), p. .
123) See also S. Peers, The European Community’s criminal law competence: The plot
thickens, EL Rev  (), pp. ,  and Douma & Vedder, supra note  at p. .
124) Article () TFEU.
Roel Meeus / JEEPL . () – 
. Conclusion
. Over the years European norm-setting for an adequate Member State
enforcement of EU environmental law has increased, ﬁrst in ECJ case law and
later also in environmental directives and regulations.The ECJ and the EU leg-
islator seem to try to ﬁll in the gaps caused by Member States not adequately
observing their obligation to achieve the prescribed environmental results. As
a result, it is now beyond dispute that the sanctions Member States (have to)
implement must comply with certain instrumental requirements (Greek Maize
Case) and that the EU legislator has the competence to determine criminal
environmental oﬀences in directives (Environmental Crime Case and, since
 December , Article () TFEU). Before the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty, the EC made use of its criminal competence in environmental
matters by adopting the Eco Crime Directive //EC and amending the
Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC. Yet the ECJ had clariﬁed that
the type and level of criminal sanctions could not be determined at EC level
(Ship Source Pollution Case). Hence the ECJ had clearly drawn the line to EC
proceedings in this matter. As a result, the Eco Crime Directive //EC
and the (amended) Ship Source Pollution Directive //EC do not spec-
ify the type and level of the criminal sanctions Member States have to intro-
duce. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty however no longer seems to
prevent the approximation of the type and level of criminal sanctions in envi-
ronmental directives, but at the same time provides each Member State with
an important emergency brake.
. However, the discussed EU sanctioning requirements are deﬁcient. Blom-
berg points out that the vague general enforcement requirements—more spe-
ciﬁcally the requirements of deterrence and eﬀectiveness—mainly oﬀer ex post-
guidance in determining whether a Member State had—or had not—taken
adequate enforcement measures, rather than ex ante-guidance in determin-
ing adequate enforcement measures in advance. Subsequently, speciﬁc sanc-
tioning requirements occur only occasionally in sectoral environmental direc-
tives and regulations, and seem to be set at random. The Eco Crime Direc-
tive //EC imposes criminal sanctioning requirements that are not lim-
ited to one environmental sector, but does not approximate the type and
the level of the criminal sanctions and does not impose criminal liability
on legal persons. The same is true for the (amended) Ship Source Pollution
Directive //EC that imposes criminal sanctions for ship-source dis-
charges of polluting substances in designated areas. Thus one might doubt
 Roel Meeus / JEEPL . () –
whether, with regard to the sanctioning of violations, the current EU sanc-
tioning requirements suﬃce to correct the enforcement deﬁcit in environmen-
tal law.
